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Abstract 
 
Price controls established in an emissions allowance market to constrain allowance prices 
between a ceiling and a floor offer a mechanism to reduce cost uncertainty in a cap-and-trade 
program; however, they could provide opportunities for strategic actions by firms that 
would result in lower government revenue and greater emissions than in the absence of controls. 
In particular, when the ceiling price is supported by introducing new allowances into the market, 
firms could choose to buy allowances at the ceiling price, regardless of the prevailing market 
price, in order to lower the equilibrium price of all allowances.  Those purchases could either be 
transacted by a group of firms intending to manipulate the market or be induced through the 
introduction of inaccurate information about the cost of emissions abatement that causes firms to 
purchase allowances at the ceiling. Theory and simulations using estimates of the elasticity of 
allowance demand for U.S. firms suggest that the manipulation could be profitable under the 
stylized setting and assumptions evaluated in the paper, although in practice many other 
conditions will determine its use.  
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I. Introduction 
 In light of growing concern about global climate change, some countries, including the 
United States, Australia, and New Zealand, are considering establishing a cap-and-trade 
program, similar to that already enacted in the European Union and 10 states in the northeastern 
United States, to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHG). Under 
such a program, the government would set a limit, or cap, on total GHG emissions (measured as 
carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions, or CO2e, which is the amount of emissions of carbon 
dioxide alone that would cause an equivalent amount of global warming) and would require 
regulated entities, such as oil refiners, natural gas distributors, large electricity generators, and 
chemical companies, to hold rights, or allowances, for their emissions. After allowances were 
initially distributed, entities could buy and sell them and would be required each year to submit a 
number of allowances equal to their CO2e emissions from the previous year. The cost of those 
allowances and the cost of eliminating emissions in excess of those allowances represent the cost 
of complying with the cap-and-trade program. 
Allowance prices under such a program would change from day to day in response to 
changes in expectations about the marginal cost of reducing emissions and the demand for 
emissions-intensive goods and services. In the face of such uncertainty about compliance costs, 
some have proposed placing controls on allowance prices in the form of a maximum price, 
sometimes called a price ceiling or safety valve price, and a minimum price, or price floor.1 Such 
controls, proponents argue, would achieve a policy goal of trading off the economic costs with 
the environmental goals of a cap-and-trade program, and several economists have even 
concluded that such controls would only minimally affect the emissions objective of the 
program.2 
That research, however, implicitly assumes that market participants will not use the price-
control mechanism to influence the price of allowances. The research presented here illustrates 
conditions under which participants could lower their cost of compliance with a cap-and-trade 
program by weakening the cap, thus reducing the environmental benefits of the program. That 
finding relies on the assumption that the cap-and-trade program would adopt a price-control 
mechanism similar to that found in most U.S. proposals: it would maintain the price ceiling 
through the release of additional allowances into the market when the allowance price threatens 
to exceed the ceiling price, but would not preclude such a release any time market participants 
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are willing to pay the ceiling price for allowances, and would not include an equivalent 
mechanism for retracting those allowances should allowance prices later fall. That means that 
any release of additional allowances would permanently relax the allowance cap, regardless of 
the long-term marginal costs of emissions abatement. Thus, if one or more market participants 
were to purchase allowances at the ceiling price, whatever the actual equilibrium price, they 
would be lowering the equilibrium price for all allowances, thereby providing a public good to 
themselves and other regulated entities by lowering the cost of all allowances.  
The provision of that public good – described throughout this paper as a manipulation – 
is a possible unintended consequence of price controls not discussed elsewhere in the literature. 
The analysis in this paper thus complements research on price manipulation in general and on 
manipulation specific to allowance markets by monopsonist buyers.3 The unintended 
consequence may not conform to every reader’s definition of manipulation, because it relies on a 
natural market response to price controls implemented as described in many cap-and-trade 
proposals. In addition, the manipulation does not adversely affect other market participants, as 
many market manipulation strategies do, but instead leaves taxpayers worse off through lower 
government revenue and reduced environmental benefit. As a result, neither the legality of the 
manipulation nor the response of regulators is obvious, and for that reason this paper remains 
agnostic on any regulatory response or costs incurred by participants to avoid a regulatory 
response.  
The next section describes the unintended consequences that would appear to often 
accompany price controls, most of which were not predicted before their implementation. 
Section III describes a hypothetical U.S. cap-and-trade program and explains qualitatively how 
the manipulation of price controls may be one such unintended consequence of such controls in a 
cap-and-trade market. Section IV brings theory to that explanation, and Section V describes 
some of the key parameters defining the feasibility of the manipulation within the hypothetical 
program. Section VI uses those parameter estimates to describe the payoffs of the potential 
manipulation and further characterize the manipulation from the perspective of market 
participants. Section VII concludes. 
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II. Historical Use of Price Controls 
Many economists believe that a tax is the most efficient mechanism to regulate GHG 
emissions. And some point out that a cap-and-trade program that includes price controls could 
mimic a tax by limiting the economic costs of a policy to reduce emissions. Furthermore, some 
suggest that because the cap-and-trade program would be created through a government policy, it 
might operate differently than other markets, for example, energy and agricultural commodity 
markets. However, like price controls or price stabilization policies used in other markets, price 
controls in allowance markets may have unintended and detrimental consequences. In other 
markets, those various consequences tend to be largely unforeseen when the price controls are 
introduced. The unintended consequences of price controls in an emissions allowance market 
may or may not be similarly unpredictable.  
Generally, price controls can be implemented in one of two ways: regulation or supply 
management. The regulatory approach simply prohibits any buying or selling at prices above a 
maximum price or below a minimum price. Alternatively, controlling prices with supply 
management requires the market overseer – in many cases a government entity – to adjust the 
supply of the price-controlled commodity to eliminate excess supply in the case of a price floor 
and eliminate excess demand in the case of a price ceiling. 
Common examples of regulatory price controls include rent controls, which limit the 
rental rate a housing owner can charge renters, and the minimum wage, which places a floor on 
what an employer can pay employees. It is well established that price controls can create 
inefficiencies in the marketplace, for example, by preventing housing from being allocated to 
those willing to pay the most for it, or preventing jobs from being allocated to those willing to 
work for the lowest wage. But price controls can also have unintended consequences that are 
indirectly related to the consumption of the controlled good. For example, in the early 1970s the 
U.S. government placed a maximum price on crude oil. Although intended to dampen the 
exposure of U.S. consumers to rising energy prices, those price controls created immediate 
gasoline shortages and are thought to have created disincentives to produce oil domestically, 
which ultimately contributed to a long-term reliance on foreign oil.4 
Regulatory price controls are also present in markets with active trading, which may offer 
market participants opportunities to capitalize on any inefficiency created by the controls. Most 
deregulated electricity markets in the United States currently have a price ceiling set at $1,000 
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per megawatt-hour (MWhr), far above the typical price of between $30 and $100 per MWhr.5 At 
that price, typically reached 10-20 hours each year, the market overseer (called the independent 
systems operator) of each regional electricity grid intervenes to clear the market by deciding 
which firms will produce electricity, which firms will receive that electricity, and the price at 
which they will both transact. The infrequency with which those price ceilings are reached 
minimizes any negative consequences of such intervention. Other price controls in electricity 
markets, however, have proved less benign. For example, when the California electricity market 
was deregulated in the 1990s, that deregulation applied only to the price at which electricity 
distributors could purchase electricity on the open market. California retained a regulatory price 
ceiling for consumers, with the result that distributors were forced to purchase electricity at 
market prices but could pass on only a fraction of those costs (about $60 per MWhr) to 
California consumers. That discrepancy between the price at which distributors had to purchase 
electricity and the price at which they could sell electricity created an opportunity for some 
market participants, such as Enron, to manipulate the market for their own profit. Although the 
opportunities for manipulation created by the price controls were not the sole cause of the 
California energy crisis, they are generally recognized as a contributing factor.6   
Supply management, the second mechanism for controlling prices, has been used by the 
U.S. government at various times over the past century to stabilize prices of gold, tin, and silver. 
That type of price control requires the market overseer to have either a sufficiently large stock of 
the commodity to satisfy excess demand or a cash reserve with which to purchase excess supply. 
If excess demand or supply remains after the overseer’s resources are exhausted, the market 
price will rise above the price ceiling or fall below the price floor.  
In theory, price controls implemented through supply management should have a 
stabilizing effect on the price, assuming the intention to implement and enforce the controls is 
credible to the market.7 Perfect credibility, however, requires that the market overseer possess an 
inexhaustible supply of the commodity or cash. Without such credibility, as would be the case if 
the government lacks the resources or authority to support a particular price under any 
circumstance, market participants anticipating the reserve’s imminent exhaustion would be 
expected to engage in a speculative attack on the price-controlled commodity. To do so, they 
would buy the controlled item at the ceiling price to build their own supply and exhaust the 
government’s, and then, sell to the market when the price rises above the ceiling.8 In a cap-and-
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trade setting, a speculative attack would not be expected to occur if the government had the 
authority to print an unlimited number of additional allowances, as some proposals have allowed.  
A price floor can also invite a speculative attack. For example, when the United Kingdom 
decided in 1990 to join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), it had to guarantee that 
the pound’s valuation would fluctuate by no more than 6 percent relative to other member 
country currencies. In September 1992 both domestic and international pressures pushed the 
pound toward the lower bound of that range. In an effort to increase the value of the pound, the 
U.K. government sought to reduce supply by purchasing billions of pounds and repeatedly 
raising interest rates. Despite this, currency traders sold the pound short, in effect betting that the 
government would fail to maintain the price floor. The government ultimately withdrew from the 
ERM and allowed the pound to decline in value, generating billions in profits for those currency 
traders who had sold the pound short at the government-supported floor.9 A similar speculative 
attack occurred in 1985 when the International Tin Council failed in its effort to maintain a tin 
price floor.10  
Finally, price controls have also been observed to have behavioral implications for 
market participants. For example, the behavioral economics literature finds evidence that the 
presence of price floors and ceilings causes participants in a laboratory to migrate toward those 
price boundaries, as if they provided significant information about the value of the commodity in 
question.11 Another strain of economics research provides evidence that price ceilings serve as a 
focal point for tacit collusion among producers. Research suggests that the credit card industry in 
the 1980s may have used state-specific interest rate ceilings as a focal point for setting interest 
rates, which then served as stable equilibrium rates even in the presence of competition that 
should have forced rates lower. As a result, the price ceiling may have actually raised consumer 
prices for credit card debt.12 Other behavioral reactions to price controls were observed during 
the U.S. government’s attempt to apply controls to the gold market in the 1960s.13 In that episode 
the government had a strategic reserve of gold that it could use to increase the supply and thus 
reduce gold prices if it felt that prices were too high. However, the government did not stipulate 
conditions under which it might release gold from that reserve. The resulting uncertainty is 
credited with causing consumers and producers of gold to require a higher return for their gold 
holdings, which in turn caused the price of gold to increase at a faster rate than it would have 
otherwise.  
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III. Manipulating Price Controls in the Emissions Allowance Market 
Proposals in the United States for implementing price controls in a cap-and-trade 
emissions allowance market vary, but all rely on the U.S. government’s ability to adjust the 
supply of allowances to keep the equilibrium price between the ceiling and floor. Many recent 
proposals would control prices by establishing a minimum price at which market participants can 
purchase allowances from the government, and a maximum price through the use of either a 
limited or an unlimited reserve of additional allowances. The details of their execution vary, but 
in most such proposals the reserve is intended to offer market participants an opportunity to 
purchase additional allowances at a fixed ceiling price should there be excess demand at that 
price. For expositional simplicity, this paper will assume that participants can purchase those 
allowances at the ceiling price at their convenience—that is, whether or not the ceiling price is 
binding—and that the reserve is sufficiently large to support the demand described in this paper 
at the price ceiling. That does not mean the reserve would need to be infinitely large, although it 
could be, but only that it represent a sizeable fraction of the annual cap relative to the economy’s 
responsiveness to changes in allowance prices (in practice, this could mean the reserve would be 
5 to 20 percent of any one year’s issued allowances).  
The efficacy of such a price ceiling design rests on the assumption that market 
participants will not purchase allowances from the reserve if the allowance price does not 
warrant such purchases. But the presence of the ceiling and the implications associated with the 
permanent relaxation of the cap whenever allowances are released from the reserve could 
provide market participants with an incentive to purchase allowances from the reserve at the 
ceiling price even if the market price is significantly lower. That incentive stems from the fact 
that, all else equal, as the supply of allowances increases, the allowance price would be expected 
to decrease.  
To motivate the analysis and provide a backdrop for the remainder of the paper, suppose 
the United States adopted a cap-and-trade program that reduced emissions relative to 2005 levels 
by 80 percent in 2050, but by only a small amount in the first year of the program. Firms in the 
three sectors assumed to be regulated under such a hypothetical program – electric utilities, 
refining, and large manufacturing – would generate approximately 5.1 billion tons of CO2e 
emissions in 2010 in the absence of a cap-and-trade program, according to baseline emissions 
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data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).14 To achieve the desired emissions 
reduction, the program would issue approximately 5 billion allowances each year for the first 10 
years and then reduce the number of allowances issued such that 130 billion allowances would 
have been issued by 2050. Consistent with other cap-and-trade proposals, the hypothetical 
program used here would include a price ceiling of $30 that is maintained by an allowance 
reserve, with rules for its use as described above. Regulated firms could use allowances issued in 
one year for compliance in any future year (i.e., they could “bank” allowances) and, to a lesser 
extent, use allowances issued for future years for compliance in the current year (i.e., borrow 
allowances). Finally, the hypothetical program would include provisions for entities not covered 
by the cap to generate emissions reductions, called offsets, and funding for other approaches to 
reducing carbon emissions similar to other cap-and-trade proposals. 
Thus, if the regulated firms were not to consider their need for allowances beyond the 
first year (or if allowances could not be saved and used in later years), and if 5.2 billion 
allowances were released in that first year, the price for allowances that year would be zero in the 
absence of a price floor, because the supply of allowances would exceed the demand even at a 
zero price. However, if only 5 billion allowances were released in the first year, the demand for 
allowances would exceed the supply by 0.1 billion allowances. Assuming that allowances are not 
allocated to regulated entities for free but must be purchased, the presence of the reserve would 
give regulated entities two options for purchasing allowances. Either they could purchase the 
necessary 5 billion allowances at the market price (reflecting the marginal abatement cost) and 
reduce their emissions by 0.1 billion tons, or they could pay the ceiling price to introduce an 
additional 0.1 billion allowances into the marketplace, thereby causing allowance scarcity to 
disappear and the market price for any additional required allowances to fall to zero. Assuming 
an economy-wide elasticity of demand for allowances in the first year of -0.10 and an 
equilibrium allowance price of $20, the decision to purchase the necessary 5 billion allowances 
would cost regulated entities $100 billion. But if some degree of collective action were open to 
them, they could instead induce the introduction of 0.1 billion new allowances to the market by 
buying them from the reserve at a cost of $3 billion (each reserve allowance costs $30) and then 
access the remaining 5 billion allowances at zero cost (because the market would now contain 
5.1 billion allowances, equal to business-as-usual emissions).  
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Alternatively, consider the same initial setup where the regulated firms are 0.1 billion 
allowances short, but now new information is released to the market indicating larger baseline 
emissions and higher costs of reducing those emissions than previously expected, which together 
suggest that the allowance price should be $38 instead of $20.15 With a price ceiling of $30 and 
an elasticity of allowance demand of -0.10, market participants would have excess demand at 
$30 and thus would purchase allowances from the government’s reserve until the equilibrium 
price falls to $30 or they exhaust the reserve. Under those conditions, they would purchase 0.1 
billion allowances from the reserve, causing the allowance price to equilibrate at the ceiling price 
of $30. If that initial information about baseline emissions were subsequently determined to be 
inaccurate, or were reversed by new information, the marketplace would then hold 5.1 billion 
allowances, equal to baseline emissions, and the equilibrium price for all allowances would fall 
to zero. 
These simple examples ignore the potential presence of a price floor and the fact that 
many regulated entities would consider their allowance needs over a multiple-year time frame, 
and they assume that at least some large regulated entities would prefer lower allowance prices 
to higher prices.16 However, the examples illustrate three features of a cap-and-trade market with 
a price ceiling: 1) regulated entities could lower allowance prices by deliberately inducing the 
introduction of new allowances into the market; 2) market participants could be induced by new 
information to purchase allowances at the ceiling, which would result in a lower equilibrium 
price of allowances if that information were later reversed; and 3) each release of allowances 
from the reserve benefits every regulated entity, because the new supply lowers the allowance 
price for everyone. Although active manipulation is the focus of the remainder of this paper, it is 
straightforward to extend the results to the information case or to consider a case where the 
manipulation involves the timed introduction of information about high abatement costs when 
the allowance price naturally approaches the ceiling, to induce others to purchase reserve 
allowances. 
The active manipulation of the price ceiling lowers overall compliance costs for those 
regulated entities involved in the manipulation if the compliance savings resulting from a lower 
equilibrium price exceed the cost of manipulation. And, consistent with the standard public 
goods game, where in this case the “public” is defined as the other regulated firms, compliance 
costs are further lowered as more regulated entities participate in the manipulation. However, 
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because the regulated entities benefit regardless of whether they participate in the manipulation, 
there would be an incentive to free ride.17 If a binding agreement among regulated entities is 
possible, they might agree to each purchase a select number of allowances from the reserve, or a 
few entities might agree to strategically release information to the market suggesting that the 
allowance price should be higher than the price ceiling, thus encouraging other market 
participants to purchase allowances from the reserve. However, that type of outright collusion is 
explicitly illegal, as is the intentional introduction of inaccurate information, and thus the 
regulated entities would need to rely on tacit, or unstated, cooperation to execute such a 
strategy.18 The model developed in the next section provides insights into the profitability of 
such tacit cooperation to manipulate the allowance price. 
 
IV. Theory of Manipulation 
The model cap-and-trade market issues Χ emission allowances during a given period T , 
where the length of that period is measured in annual compliance cycles; both Χ and T  are 
exogenous. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that usage of allowances is optimal within 
each period but that entities do not consider the optimal number of allowances to hold for 
compliance cycles subsequent to T . Thus, the length of each period represents the planning 
horizon for regulated entities with respect to the use of allowances under the program.19  
The market regulates the CO2e emissions of I  firms such that in a static equilibrium, 
each firm i I∈  endogenously uses ix  emissions allowances to operate, where iI xΧ =∑ , and 
abates any remaining emissions. The marginal cost of emission abatement, ( )C a , is assumed to 
be increasing and convex ( 0C′ >  and  0C′′ > ), and the cost of no abatement is assumed to be 
zero ( ( )0 0C = ). Let i if x≡ Χ  be the fraction of total issued allowances used by firm i I∈  in 
the static equilibrium, such that 1iI f =∑ . The endogenous equilibrium price during period T  is 
e
p , which can be considered the average price at which firms purchase allowances over the 
period. The economy-wide elasticity of demand for allowances, 0ε ≤ , defined for a change in 
the number of allowances ( Δ ) relative to the total number of issued allowances ( Χ ), is 
approximated as:  
 ( )e ep p pε Δ
Δ Χ
=
−
 (1) 
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where pΔ  is the equilibrium price when there exist Χ + Δ  allowances. That elasticity of 
allowance demand incorporates the response to changes in the allowance price resulting from 
both changes in the demand for emissions-intensive goods and services and changes in emissions 
abatement technologies. Similarly, the ith  firm’s elasticity of allowance demand, 0iε ≤ , is 
approximated as: 
 
( )
( )
i i i
i
e e
x x x
p p p
ε Δ
Δ
−
=
−
 (2) 
where ixΔ  is the equilibrium demand for allowances by that firm when Δ  new allowances are 
introduced into the market, causing the equilibrium price to fall to pΔ . In addition to knowing 
their own elasticity of demand for allowances, firms are assumed to know the economy-wide 
elasticity and the allowance price (and its path) with certainty. 
 Next consider a deviation from the equilibrium where a subset D I⊆  of the firms 
purchase emissions allowances at the price ceiling ( p ) such that firm d D∈  purchases dδ  
allowances, where dDδΔ =∑ . For expositional simplicity, each deviating firm will be assumed 
to purchase a constant proportion ν  (where /d dxν δ= ) of its equilibrium allowance demand at 
the ceiling at exactly the same time and incur no transaction costs in the process, such that: 
 
d
d
D d
f
x
δ
νθΔ = ≡
Χ ∑
 (3) 
where dx  is the equilibrium demand for allowances before the deviation by those firms that 
engage in the deviation, ν  is the size of the deviation as a fraction of the predeviation 
equilibrium demand, and dD fθ =∑  is the size of the coalition participating in the deviation, 
measured as a fraction of aggregate equilibrium allowance demand. The assumption that each 
firm deviates by a constant proportion of its equilibrium demand allows one to consider only the 
aggregate demand of the firms participating in the deviation as a fraction of supply, measured by 
θ . Then the feasibility of the deviation can be determined based on the actual market structure of 
the regulated firms, that is, whether 1 percent of emissions ( 0.01θ = ) can be represented by a 
single deviating firm or requires 200 firms acting collectively. 
 The deviation would be profitable on net if the costs incurred under the deviation were 
less than those incurred under the nondeviating, or truthful, scenario (i.e., purchasing only Χ  
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allowances at the equilibrium price). Figure 1 graphically illustrates the costs under the two 
scenarios. Under the truthful scenario with an equilibrium price of 
e
p , regulated firms incur 
costs equal to the sum of regions A through E, where regions B and E represent allowance 
acquisition costs and regions A, C, and D are abatement costs. The deviation is defined as the 
introduction of 5 3 2 1z z z zΔ ≡ − + −  new allowances from the reserve, purchased at the ceiling 
price ( p ). That new supply causes the equilibrium price to fall to the new price pΔ , where all 
available allowances ( 3 2z zΧ ≡ − ) can be purchased. Note that when considered on an aggregate 
basis, for the equilibrium price to fall no further than pΔ , it must be the case that 5 4z z= . Under 
the deviation, when the equilibrium price falls to the new price, the aggregate of regulated firms 
add the cost of the shaded region and region F but save the cost of regions A and B. Aggregate 
profits from the deviation can be expressed as: 
 ( ) ( )
2 1
0 0
z z
eC a da p C a da p pΔ
⎡ ⎤
Π = + Χ − + Δ + Χ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫  (4) 
The first two terms on the right-hand side of (4) represent compliance costs under truthful 
participation, and the bracketed term represents compliance costs under the deviation. Before 
drawing conclusions about (4), it will be useful to construct the comparable profit statement for 
the individual firm. 
 Given heterogeneity in the firm-specific elasticity of demand for allowances, the 
profitability of the deviation will vary across firms. Following the formulation of (4), and 
assuming that Figure 1 depicts the marginal abatement costs for a particular firm and the demand 
for the goods produced by that firm, the deviation will result in positive profits ( dπ ) for the 
deviating firm if the firm’s cost of deviating is less than the cost of not deviating and purchasing 
allowances at the equilibrium market price: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 1
0 0
z z
d e d d d dC a da p x C a da p x pπ δ δΔ Δ
⎡ ⎤
= + − + + −
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫  (5) 
where the dth deviating firm purchases either 3 2dx z z≡ −  allowances under the truthful scenario 
at the equilibrium price or 5 3 2 1d z z z zδ ≡ − + −  allowances at the ceiling price and then the 
remainder of its allowance requirement ( d dx δΔ − ) at the reduced price pΔ , where 4 1dx z zΔ ≡ −
 
is 
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the firm’s increased demand at the new, reduced price. Only if every firm participates in the 
deviation will Xν = Δ ; otherwise, Xν > Δ  and 5 4z z≠ . 
 The profit described by (4) and (5) can be bounded by two corner conditions, as 
described in Result 1.  
 
Result 1. a) Given the above setup, deviation profit is bounded from below by the case where the 
aggregate firms (single firm) have a perfectly inelastic marginal abatement cost curve, and from 
above by the case where society has a perfectly inelastic demand for emissions-intensive goods 
and services produced by the aggregate firms (single firm). b) Consequently, deviation profit will 
increase for firms that face a more elastic marginal abatement cost curve and more inelastic 
demand from consumers for their goods and services. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Including aggregate and firm-specific marginal abatement cost curves and the 
corresponding demand curves for the emissions-intensive goods and services produced by the 
aggregate firms and each specific firm adds uncertainty to the above model while yielding only 
limited additional insights. Given that the elasticity of demand for allowances incorporates both 
the marginal abatement cost curve and the demand curve for emissions-intensive goods and 
services into a single elasticity, this analysis focuses on the lower bound as a conservative 
estimate of profit, which can be estimated using only that elasticity.20  
Equation (4) can be reformulated to describe the lower bound on profits as: 
 ( )ep p pΔΠ = − Χ − Δ  (6) 
By rearranging (1) and combining with (3), pΔ  can be defined as the higher of the new, reduced 
equilibrium price or the price floor ( p ). The floor may be unspecified, or it may be zero, or it 
may be higher as determined by the cap-and-trade market rules: 
 max 1 ,
e
vp p pθ
εΔ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
= +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥
⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (7) 
From (7), and noting that 0ε ≤ , the introduction of allowances from the reserve would lower the 
equilibrium price by an increasing amount as the size of the coalition (θ ) increases and the 
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fraction of equilibrium demand that each firm purchases from the reserve (ν ) increases. This 
leads to the following result: 
 
Result 2. a) For the deviation to be profitable at a given equilibrium price (
e
p ), the absolute 
value of the economy-wide elasticity of allowance demand must be less than the ratio of the 
equilibrium price to the price ceiling, 
e
p pε < . b) Under that condition, the profitability of the 
deviation increases as the equilibrium price approaches the price ceiling. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Intuitively, the deviation requires firms to pay p  to increase the supply of allowances in 
the market, which becomes less costly relative to the truthful scenario as the equilibrium price 
approaches p . Result 2 demonstrates that a necessary but not sufficient condition for a 
profitable deviation is that 1ε > − , which is the limit at which the equilibrium price equals the 
ceiling price. However, if the equilibrium price is below (e.g., half of) the ceiling price, a more 
inelastic demand for allowances is necessary for the deviation to be profitable.  
Similarly, the lower bound of equation (5) can be reformulated as: 
 ( )d e d d d dp x p x pπ δ δΔ Δ= − − −  (8) 
Rearranging (2) and combining with (7) produces the deviating firm’s increased demand at the 
price described by (7): 
 1 dd dx x
ε
νθ
εΔ
⎛ ⎞
= +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
 (9) 
where dε  is the firm-specific elasticity of allowance demand for deviating firms. The lower 
equilibrium price produced by the deviation causes all firms to demand more allowances than 
they would under the truthful scenario. Firms with a more elastic demand for allowances would 
want more allowances at the new equilibrium price than firms with a more inelastic demand.  
Profits earned by the dth firm, normalized for the quantity of allowances purchased in the 
truthful scenario by that firm, can be expressed by substituting (7) and (9) into (5) and 
rearranging:  
 ( ) 1 1d d e e dx p p p θ νθπ ν ν ν εε ε
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
= − − − − + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥
⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 (10) 
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The first term on the right-hand side of (10) is negative and represents the cost that each 
participating firm would incur by participating in the deviation; this term will be identical for 
each participating firm. The sign of the bracketed term cannot be determined and represents the 
combination of increased demand and reduced cost at the lower price. That leads to the following 
result: 
 
Result 3. A necessary but not sufficient condition for the lower bound on deviation profits to be 
positive is that 1dν ε− < . If that condition is satisfied, the lower bound on profits increases as a) 
the equilibrium price approaches the ceiling price; b) the economy exhibits more inelastic 
demand for allowances; or c) more firms participate in the deviation.  
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Setting firm profits in equation (10) equal to zero, dividing the whole equation by the size 
of each firm’s deviation (ν ), and taking the limit as ν
 
approaches zero, one can calculate the 
minimum coalition size necessary for a firm to be indifferent between deviating and not 
deviating:  
 min 1
e
e d
p p
p
εθ
ε
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
− −
=
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
+
⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (11) 
 
Corollary to Result 3. Assuming 1 0dε− < < , the minimum size of the coalition necessary for a 
profitable deviation a) falls as the equilibrium price approaches the price ceiling and b) falls as 
the economy-wide demand for allowances becomes more inelastic. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
Finally, equation (7) suggests that suggests that the price floor may impose practical 
limits on the benefit of increasing coalition size or the size of each firm’s deviation. Assuming 
that the new, deviation-produced equilibrium price is constrained by the price floor ( p ) and 
reformulating (8) as ( )d e d d d dp x p x pπ δ δΔ⎡ ⎤= − + −
⎣ ⎦
 produces the constrained version of (10): 
 ( ) ( )( )1d d e e d ex p p p p p pπ ν ε= − − + − +  (12) 
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Equation (12) is strictly decreasing as the fraction of allowances purchased by a deviating firm 
increases, because at the price floor, purchasing additional allowances from the reserve will not 
further lower the equilibrium price. Setting profits in (12) to zero produces the following 
expression for the largest profitable deviation given a price floor: 
 max 1
e
d
e
p p p
p p p
ν ε
⎛ ⎞
− ⎛ ⎞
= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
− ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (13) 
The fact that (12) and (13) are not a function of coalition size (θ ) comes as a 
consequence of the individual nature of a firm’s profit during the deviation. When the 
combination of participation and deviation size causes the price to fall to the price floor, a larger 
coalition will no longer produce a positive externality on price. Thus, at the point where the price 
is constrained, there is a maximum deviation, represented by equation (13), where each deviating 
firm is indifferent between deviating and not deviating. That maximum deviation holds true for 
any coalition size above that where the deviation produced by (13) causes the equilibrium price 
to fall to the price floor. That coalition can be characterized using (7) and setting p pΔ =  such 
that 
 max( 1)ep pθ ε ν= −%  (14) 
 
If the coalition increases in size beyond θ% , the deviation can become no more profitable, 
because the price floor is binding. However, firms can lower their deviation to increase their 
profitability, as described in Result 4.  
 
Result 4. The deviation that produces the maximum profit ( ˆmpν ) for any given degree of 
participation (θ ) is defined as: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
1
ˆ min , 1
2 1
d e e
mp
d e
pp p p
p
ε ε θ ε
ν
θε ε θ
⎛ ⎞+ + − ⎛ ⎞
= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
− ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (15) 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
V. Model Parameters in the Hypothetical Cap-and-Trade Program 
Given the ambiguity in the sign of (10), one can gain insight into the conditions under 
which manipulation of the price ceiling would be profitable by considering (10) in light of some 
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actual parameter values, specifically, the economy-wide and firm-specific elasticity of demand 
for allowances. For purposes of this paper, sector-specific elasticities proxy for firm 
heterogeneity across sectors, and an aggregate economy-wide elasticity is determined 
independent of the specifics of any cap-and-trade proposal, using an approach developed by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that relies on parameters and inputs from several other 
published models.21 In addition, CBO has developed a model to estimate the cost of cap-and-
trade proposals between 2012 and 2050 that incorporates the effects of offsets and other 
programs designed to reduce the cost of a cap-and-trade program.22 That model is used to 
estimate an economy-wide elasticity that reflects the various features – banking, borrowing, 
offsets, and other cost-reducing components – of this paper’s hypothetical program. 
Complicating the estimation of elasticities for use in the simulations is the fact that both 
firm-specific and economy-wide elasticities are expected to change over time. As the economy 
grows, new technologies and abatement solutions are expected to become available that will 
cause the elasticity to increase in absolute value over time; i.e., the demand for allowances across 
the economy becomes more elastic with respect to the allowance price. Similarly, the demand for 
emissions-intensive goods and services will adjust to the increased price for those goods and 
services, which will further cause the economy-wide elasticity to increase in absolute value. 
Selecting the appropriate elasticities that incorporate changes to both those supply and demand 
conditions over time thus requires one to consider the time period in which the manipulation 
described above might occur and be most profitable to regulated entities. The first few years of 
the program would appear to be the best candidate years for considering the manipulation, 
because during that period, regulators and other oversight agencies would be the least 
accustomed to the market’s operation and therefore could be less likely to identify behavior of 
market participants that would be abnormal. At the same time, any cap-and-trade program would 
be expected to include some regulated entities that engage in highly sophisticated trading 
practices in other energy markets and thus have the resources necessary to quickly understand 
the dynamics of the allowance market. In addition, many proposals for a price ceiling stipulate 
that it rise more rapidly over time than the expected rate of allowance price increase, meaning 
that the ceiling price will be closest to the allowance price at the start of the program. For those 
reasons, the elasticities used in the simulations are estimates for the first 10 years of the program.  
 
 Page 19 
 
Elasticity, economy-wide (ε ). There are two approaches to estimating the economy-wide 
elasticity of allowance demand in the first few years of the program. First, one could estimate an 
aggregate elasticity that incorporates both the supply of abatement technologies and the demand 
for emissions-intensive goods and services for the group of regulated entities. Over the first 10 
years of the program, the estimated elasticity for the regulated sectors ranges from -0.06 to -0.14, 
with a mean of -0.10.23 That range accounts for different assumptions about the development and 
introduction of abatement technology for those sectors and the ease with which regulated entities 
can shift their production and consumption of carbon-intensive goods and services to less 
carbon-intensive alternatives.  
That elasticity, calculated for just the regulated sectors, approximates the elasticity for a 
cap-and-trade program that does not include other features, such as energy efficiency programs, 
offset allowances, or carbon capture and sequestration. The second approach to estimating the 
elasticity involves incorporating some of the features that are included under the hypothetical 
cap-and-trade program and would be expected to increase the responsiveness of the economy to 
changes in the allowance price. That is, any changes in the cost of abatement in sectors covered 
under a cap-and-trade program will trigger responses throughout the economy, but program 
features are intended to give firms increased flexibility for adjusting to those changes. In the 
second approach to estimating elasticities, the economy is assumed to be in equilibrium, given a 
combination of allowances and program features over the planning horizon of the regulated 
entity, and a change in the allowance supply causes regulated entities to reequilibrate over their 
planning horizon given the new supply of allowances. Over the first 10 years of the program, the 
elasticity of allowance demand that incorporates those features, estimated using CBO’s climate 
model, ranges from -0.10 to -0.15. For modeling purposes an elasticity of -0.12 is used, although 
a range between -0.06 to -0.30 is used for sensitivity analysis, where the more inelastic values 
represent conditions at the beginning of a program and the more elastic values represent 
conditions more than a decade into the program. 
 
Elasticity, sector-specific ( iε ). Electric utilities would account for approximately 40 percent of 
total emissions, according to EIA, and the average elasticity for those electric utilities over the 
first 10 years is expected to range from -0.10 to -0.27, with the larger elasticities occurring in the 
later years.24 The transportation sector, which includes petroleum products companies, would 
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make up 34 percent of emissions, with an average elasticity for firms in that sector during the 
first 10 years between -0.03 and -0.05. The upper end of the range is defined as a case where 
there are significant technological improvements in automobile emissions reduction options. The 
remaining 26 percent of emissions would come from the manufacturing sector, with an average 
elasticity ranging between -0.05 and -0.08. For modeling purposes an elasticity of -0.10 is taken 
as representative of the deviating firm. Result 1 states that those firms with the most elastic 
demand for allowances are most likely to profit from the deviation, although that increased profit 
will not be observed when modeling the lower bound on profits, as is done here. 
 
Firm Planning Horizon and Issued Emissions Allowances ( Χ ). The planning horizon used by 
the regulated entities would affect the amount of capital required to implement the manipulation 
and the feasibility of the manipulation given a finite reserve of allowances available in any given 
year. Returning to the hypothetical cap-and-trade example, if all firms were optimally banking 
and borrowing allowances over the 40-year period from 2010 to 2050, with 130 billion 
allowances issued over that period, the introduction of a 400-million-allowance deviation from 
the reserve would represent only 0.3 percent of total allowances issued over those 40 years. At 
the estimated midpoint elasticity of demand for allowances (-0.12), the introduction of that 
quantity of allowances would be expected to reduce the price by only 2.5 percent. However, the 
effective elasticity of demand over 40 years is expected to be closer to -0.50, which suggests 
only a 0.6 percent reduction in price. If instead firms have a 3-year planning horizon during 
which they optimally bank and borrow allowances, those additional 400 million allowances 
would represent 3 percent of the total issued allowances, which, with a -0.12 elasticity of 
demand, would be expected to reduce the price by closer to 25 percent.   
Table 1 presents the number of permits issued in each year and the number of permits 
required to increase supply by 3 percent in the hypothetical cap-and-trade program for planning 
horizons of 3, 5, and 10 years. The fourth column presents the size of the allowance reserve 
necessary to create that 3 percent supply increase, as a percentage of the first year’s allowances. 
Those selected horizons are consistent with the range of elasticities selected above. If the 
hypothetical cap-and-trade program were implemented, one might expect the planning horizon 
during the first few years of the program to be relatively short. Uncertainties in the early years of 
the program, particularly those related to the ability of the economy to develop technologies to 
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abate emissions and to the long-run commitment of policy makers to enforce the cap, could 
cause regulated entities to adopt planning horizons shorter than 10 years. It is unlikely that any 
firm would adopt a 1-year planning horizon, assuming the program was expected to remain in 
operation the following year; however, the 3-year case could be reasonable if the continuation of 
the program were politically uncertain. Once the cap-and-trade program has developed an 
operational precedent and feasible low-carbon technology has been demonstrated, regulated 
entities could be expected to extend their planning horizon, making any type of manipulation 
more difficult.  
 
Price ceiling ( p ) and price floor ( p ). The hypothetical cap-and-trade program is assumed to 
have an allowance price ceiling of $30 and a price floor of $10, which is largely consistent with 
proposed cap-and-trade programs in the United States given their emissions reduction objectives. 
 
Coalition size (θ ). As described earlier, the coalition size is defined as the percentage of 
emissions represented by the firms engaging in the manipulation (the “deviating” firms), which 
is assumed comparable to the percentage of allowance demand. Although the Environmental 
Protection Agency estimates that a cap-and-trade program could cover approximately 7,400 
firms, only 18 firms – 5 oil and gas firms and 13 power companies—would account for 40 
percent of total U.S. emissions.25 Twelve of those companies alone would each represent at least 
1 percent of total emissions, and three would each represent more than 5 percent. Thus, a 
coalition representing 1 to 10 percent of allowance demand in a U.S. cap-and-trade program 
could involve fewer than three firms. 
 
VI. Modeling and Results 
The results illustrated in Figures 2 through 6 are all for the lower bound on the deviation 
profit, as derived above. Only in Table 2 are the upper and lower bounds displayed for 
comparison purposes. Using elasticity estimates from the previous section and parameters from 
the hypothetical cap-and-trade program, Figure 2 illustrates four regions of the space delineated 
by the size of the deviation and of the coalition. The area outlined by the thick solid line (regions 
1 and 2) represents the combinations of coalition and deviation size where the deviation would 
be profitable, given the model’s assumptions. The boundary of that region represents the 
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condition where participants would be indifferent between deviating and not deviating. The 
upward-sloping section of the thick solid line is defined by solving equation (10) for zero profit. 
The flat section of that line is defined by the maximum deviation, from equation (13). That 
region of profitability, however, is divided by a thin dotted line that represents the price 
manipulation boundary, or the minimum combination of coalition and deviation necessary to 
cause the new equilibrium price to be constrained by the price floor, from equation (7). Beyond 
this line, larger deviations or larger coalitions cannot cause the price to fall any further and only 
reduce the participants’ profits. The thick dotted line defines the maximum profit for deviating 
firms, as described by equation (15). Points above and below that line would still be profitable, 
but less so. 
 The other regions (3 and 4) in Figure 2 would not be profitable. The area outside the thick 
line but to the left of the thin dotted line (region 3) would not be profitable either because the 
deviation would not be large enough or because the deviating coalition would not be large 
enough. And the area above the thick flat line (region 4) would not be profitable because the 
equilibrium price would be constrained by the price floor. For the remaining discussion, the 
region below the thin dotted line and to the right of the thick solid line (region 1) is referred to as 
the profitable deviation triangle. 
 Figures 3 and 4 quantify the magnitude of the conclusions from Result 3 under the 
parameters described in the previous section. In each figure, the top panel shows the profitable 
deviation triangle in the coalition-deviation space for various estimates of one parameter. The 
lower panel shows the largest profit obtainable – assuming the lower bound on profit – under the 
deviation as a function of coalition size, assuming that all deviating firms are optimally deviating 
as defined by equation (15). Maximum profit is expressed as a percentage of truthful 
expenditures ( d e dp xπ ), which means that if a firm were to spend $100 under the truthful 
scenario with a 50 percent profit, it would be spending $50 under the deviation scenario.  
 Given the model, an equilibrium price closer to the price ceiling would require fewer 
participants for a profitable deviation (see Figure 3). For example, a deviation could be profitably 
implemented with 3 percent of emissions represented in the coalition if the price were $6 below 
the price ceiling; if the price were $15 below the ceiling, at least 13 percent of emissions would 
need to be represented in the coalition for a profitable deviation. In addition, the maximum profit 
from a deviation increases as the equilibrium price approaches the price ceiling (lower panel of 
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Figure 3). When the price is $6 from the ceiling, a 20 percent coalition would earn the deviating 
firms up to 26 percent higher profits when they each engage in a 35 percent deviation causing a 7 
percent increase in allowance supply; when the price is $15 from the ceiling, the same coalition 
could increase its profits by only 4 percent, which would occur when they each engage in an 18 
percent deviation to increase supply by 3.6 percent.  
As predicted in Result 3, the deviation becomes more profitable when demand for 
allowances is more inelastic (see lower panel of Figure 4). For economy-wide elasticities of -0.3, 
-0.15, and -0.06 and other assumptions as described above, the lower bound on profit with a 20 
percent coalition could increase by up to 5 percent, 20 percent, and 48 percent of truthful 
expenditures, respectively (with other assumptions as described in Figure 4). Those profits would 
require deviations of 28 percent, 41 percent, and 9 percent, respectively, which would increase 
total supply by 6 percent, 8 percent, and 1.8 percent. Following Result 3, as demand for 
allowances became more inelastic for the economy, the deviation would require fewer firms in 
the coalition to be profitable.  
 The profits earned by deviating and nondeviating firms would also be expected to 
increase under the assumptions of the model as the size of the deviation increases (see Figure 5). 
The firms not engaged in the deviation (thick lines in Figure 5) would earn higher profits than 
those that do engage (thin lines in Figure 5), because the deviation would lower the allowance 
price for all firms, but the nondeviators would  not have purchased any allowances at the ceiling 
price. The difference in profits between the two types of firms would increase up to a maximum 
of ( ) ep p pν −  at which point the postdeviation equilibrium price becomes constrained by the 
price floor. For a 20 percent deviation ( 20ν =  percent), all regulated entities in the market 
would achieve maximum profits with a 35 percent coalition; however, those profits would be 39 
percent for the deviating firms and 56 percent for the nondeviating firms (with other assumptions 
as described in Figure 5). The difference between those profits would serve as an incentive to 
free ride. Alternatively, although the profits would be much lower, the differences between the 
profits of deviating and nondeviating firms would be much less when the deviation is 7 percent 
or 1 percent. 
 Finally, the simulations confirm that the minimum coalition size necessary to produce a 3 
percent profitable deviation falls as the distance between the equilibrium price and the ceiling 
price falls and the deviation increases (see Figure 6). For a deviation of 10 percent with a 20 
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percent difference between the ceiling and the equilibrium price (e.g., a $24 equilibrium price 
with a $30 ceiling), a coalition of 8 percent would cause all deviating firms to earn 3 percent 
profits. If the deviating firms were instead to engage in a 5 percent deviation with a 20 percent 
difference between the ceiling and the equilibrium price, a coalition of 12 percent would be 
necessary for deviating firms to earn 3 percent profits. 
  To bring perspective to those figures, it is useful to consider some specific examples that 
draw from the assumption about firms’ planning horizons. Table 2 does this by returning to 
Result 1 and presenting the range of profits where the lower bound on profits is defined by the 
equations in Section IV and the maximum profits are as derived in Appendix A. If, for example, 
the effective market-wide planning horizon were 5 years, firms that represent 5 percent of 
emissions would, in equilibrium and without a deviation, purchase approximately 1.25 billion 
allowances over those 5 years (see Table 2). If the equilibrium price were $24, those allowances 
would cost approximately $30 billion. Alternatively, if those firms were to purchase an aggregate 
additional 125 million allowances at a $30 price ceiling ( 10ν =  percent) in the first year of the 
program—spending $750 million to increase that first-year supply by 2.5 percent—they would 
decrease their net 5-year costs and thus earn profits of $255 million to $378 million.26 That 
represents a 7 to 10 percent annualized real return on the capital invested in the deviation, as 
shown in Table 2. If that group of deviating firms were able to expand their coalition to firms 
representing 10 percent of emissions and follow the same strategy, they could in the aggregate 
profit by $2.5 billion to $3.0 billion, for an effective annualized real return of 23 to 26 percent on 
the deviation-invested capital over the 5 years. 
   
VII. Conclusions 
This paper is not intended to predict whether or not the manipulation described will 
happen in a real market or under any of the particular legislative proposals considered by 
Congress, but only to assess the feasibility and profitability of the manipulation in a hypothetical 
cap-and-trade market with realistic parameter values. The manipulation described here is a type 
of public good game where any firm that purchases allowances at the ceiling price provides 
benefits to all regulated firms, because those purchases permanently increase the supply of 
allowances. As with any public good game, there will be a tendency for firms to free ride. 
However, when the manipulation game is considered within the context of a hypothetical U.S. 
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cap-and-trade program and the other assumptions described above, a few large firms in a market 
exhibiting a relatively inelastic demand for allowances could profitably engage in the 
manipulation. That condition could obviate the need for firms to solve coordination or free-riding 
problems. Moreover, neither the legality of the manipulation nor the response of regulators is 
clear cut, which may further ease coordination by participants. 
The opportunity for firms to manipulate the supply of allowances with the intention of 
lowering the allowance price would tend to be enhanced when demand for allowances is 
inelastic, when regulated entities have short ( 10≤  years) planning horizons, or when a few 
regulated firms represent a large share of total emissions. However, other factors could cause 
regulated entities not to engage in the manipulation even if the conditions were favorable; these 
factors include the degree of regulatory oversight and the severity of penalties, the specific rules 
describing purchases from the reserve, interactions between the allowance price and product 
prices, and differences in firms’ preferences for lower allowance prices. Moreover, increased 
allowance price volatility would be expected to decrease the profitability of the manipulation.  
In addition to the active manipulation strategy described above, the same theory and 
model can be used to evaluate other market processes that would ultimately reduce market prices 
even without some participants strategically pursuing such an objective. For example, if some 
unexpected news indicating an increase in the cost of emissions abatement or in economic 
growth were to cause the equilibrium price to reach the ceiling price, it would appear to be in any 
firm’s financial interest to purchase allowances at that price and thus increase the supply of 
allowances. If that news were later reversed or offset by other news indicating a lower cost of 
compliance, the new supply of allowances purchased at the ceiling price would result in a lower 
equilibrium price than would have prevailed had the negative and offsetting information never 
been released or had it been released in the absence of price controls.  
 An analysis of solutions to this kind of manipulation is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, the government could attempt either to eliminate the possibility of the manipulation or 
to adjust the parameters of the cap-and-trade program—for example, the price ceiling or the 
floor—such that even if the manipulation were to occur, the programmatic costs and 
environmental benefits would be comparable to the case where the manipulation did not occur. 
For example, the likelihood that the manipulation could be profitably implemented could be 
reduced by raising the price ceiling to a level 2 to 10 times higher than the anticipated 
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equilibrium price.27 In addition, a rule could be implemented that reduces the number of 
allowances any one participant may purchase from the reserve, or that imposes limitations on the 
banking or sale of allowances by firms purchasing allowances from the reserve, or that allows 
purchases from the reserve only when the allowance price comes within a given proximity to the 
ceiling price. Alternatively, given that the manipulation is made possible by the asymmetry 
created when new allowances are released to the marketplace but not retracted when they are no 
longer needed, implementing a strategy of active repurchase of reserve allowances by 
government traders when prices are below the ceiling price could make manipulation less 
effective. However, attempts by the government to eliminate or reduce the effect of the 
manipulation could have their own effects on the market’s operation, revenue, and emissions. 
And even if the opportunities for manipulation described above were reduced, the presence of 
price controls might leave the market vulnerable to other unintended consequences as described 
in the economic literature or not yet anticipated.
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Appendix A 
Proof of Result 1. a) Equations (4) and (5) can be rewritten as follows, respectively: 
 ( ) ( )
2
1
z
e
z
C a da p p pΔΠ = + − Χ − Δ∫  
and 
 ( ) ( )
2
1
z
e d d d d
z
C a da p x p x pπ δ δΔ Δ= + − − −∫  
Assume a fixed deviation Δ  and approximate the first term of the above two equations as  
 ( ) ( )
2
1
2 12
z
e
z
p pC a da z zΔ+≈ −∫  
Using Figure 1 for the aggregate regulated firm case, two additional elasticities are needed: 
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Here 
a
ε  is the elasticity for the marginal abatement cost curve and dε  is the elasticity for the demand for 
emissions-intensive goods and services. Combining with the following definitions 
 ( ) ( ) ( )4 3 2 1 3 2;   ;   ;   z z Z z z Y Z Y z z X− = − = + = Δ − =  
and simplifying produces: 
 ( ) ( )( )
2
1
2
z
e a e a de
e a dz
p X p pp pC a da
p
ε ε ε
ε ε
ΔΔ ⎛ ⎞Δ − −+
≈ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
∫  
From this it is easy to see that if 0
a
ε = , the integral also equals 0, which represents its minimum value. 
In that case, the aggregate regulated firm profit equations collapse to ( )ˆ ep p pΔΠ = − Χ − Δ . Thus, 
ˆΠ ≤ Π . And if 0, 0d aε ε= ≠ , the integral is equal to ( ) 2ep pΔΔ + , which represents its maximum 
value. In that case, the aggregate profit equations collapse to ( ) ( )2e ep p p p pΔ ΔΠ = Δ + + − Χ − Δ( . 
Given the maximum value of the first term, ˆΠ ≤ Π ≤ Π
(
. Defining the firm-specific elasticity of 
abatement and the sector-specific elasticity of demand for the goods and services produced by that firm 
allows one to derive parallel results for the firm-specific case such that πˆ π π≤ ≤ ( . The text derives the 
lower bound on profit for deviating firms (represented above by πˆ  and ˆΠ ). For comparison, the upper 
bound on profit for the dth deviating firm is: 
 ( ) 1
2
d
d d e e dx p p p x
εθν
π ν ν θν
ε ε
⎛ ⎞
= − − − − +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
(
 
b) An inelastic marginal abatement cost curve defines the lower bound of the profit, and by extension, a 
marginal abatement cost curve that is more elastic will produce larger profits. Similarly, when the demand 
for emissions-intensive goods and services is completely inelastic, profits are at an upper bound. Thus, 
profits are greater, the more elastic the abatement cost curve and the more inelastic consumer demand. 
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Proof of Result 2. a) Substituting (1) into (6) allows one to express the profit from the deviation 
as 
e
p p εΠ = − Δ − Δ . Setting that equal to zero and taking the absolute value of the elasticity 
provides the condition that aggregate regulated firm profits are positive if 
e
p pε < .  
b) Taking the derivative of the aggregate regulated firm profit from deviating with respect to the 
equilibrium price gives 0
e
p ε∂Π ∂ = − Δ ≥ , which is strictly positive under a deviation given 
downward-sloping demand for allowances. 
 
Proof of Result 3. For the lower bound on profits to be positive, the bracketed term in equation 
(10) must be strictly positive. That is, ( )1 1 0dν ε θν ε− + + > . Given that 
( ) [ ]1 ,d dε θν ε ε+ ∈ ∞ , the bracketed term will necessarily be positive if 1dν ε− < . a) Let 
e
p pγ = −  or the distance between the equilibrium price and the ceiling price. Taking the firm-
specific profit ( dπ ) from (10) and solving for ( )1 1d d d dx xπ γ ν νθ ε ν ε νθ ε∂ ∂ = − + − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  , 
which is negative whenever the deviation is profitable, given that 0ε ≤ . The term in brackets is 
positive if 1dν ε− < . 
b) Solving for [ ]2 1 2d e d d dp xπ ε νθ ε ε ν νθ ε ε∂ ∂ = + − +  , which is positive if 1dν ε− <  
because the fourth term in brackets is always positive and the term outside the brackets is always 
positive. 
c) Solving for [ ]1 2d e d d dp xπ θ ν ε ε ν νθ ε ε∂ ∂ = − + − +  , which is positive if 1dν ε− < . 
 
Corollary to Result 3. Setting 0dπ =  and dividing by ν  produces:  
 ( ) ( )0 1 1e e d dp p p θ ε ε ν θ ε ε= − − − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
Rearranging and taking the limit as 0ν →  produces equation (11).  
a) Solve for ( )min 1e dpθ γ ε ε∂ ∂ = − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , which is positive if 1 0dε+ > .  
b) Solve for ( ) ( )min 1e e dp p pθ ε ε∂ ∂ = − − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , which is negative if 1 0dε+ > .  
 
Result 4. The first equation in the minimum is derived by taking the derivative of the profit 
function, setting it equal to zero, and solving for ˆmpν . Taking the second derivative of the profit 
with respect to the deviation produces: 
 
2
2 2 1
d d
e
pπ εθ θ
ν ε ε
∂
⎛ ⎞
= −
⎜ ⎟∂
⎝ ⎠
 
Part (b) of Result 2 would suggest that 1dε ε ≤ , and since 1θ ≤ , the term in parentheses is 
positive, meaning that the second derivative is negative. That suggests that the first derivative is 
a maximum. However, when that maximum deviation causes the price to fall to the price floor, it 
describes a profit that is no longer achievable. Given that profit is strictly falling for ˆmpν ν< , the 
largest deviation that lowers the new equilibrium price is the deviation that causes the price to 
fall to the floor for any given degree of participation. That deviation is the second equation in the 
minimum.
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Figure 1. Analysis of the profitability of emissions allowance price manipulation 
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The profitability of deviating from the equilibrium allowance price is estimated by comparing 
the increased cost of the deviation, depicted by the shaded region and F, with the decreased cost 
of compliance from the lower equilibrium price, defined by regions A and B. 
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Figure 2. Profitability of deviation as a function of deviating coalition size and size of the 
deviation 
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Note:  The gray area is the profitable deviation triangle. 
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Figure 3. Profitability of deviation for various equilibrium prices and a $30 price ceiling 
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Note: Profit is the lower bound on theoretical profit. 
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Figure 4. Profitability of deviation for various economy-wide elasticities 
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Note: Profit is the lower bound on theoretical profit. 
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Figure 5. Profitability of deviation as a percentage of truthful expenditure 
  0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90% 100%
  0%
 10%
 20%
 30%
 40%
 50%
 60%
 70%
 80%
 90%
100%
Pr
of
it 
As
 
%
 
of
 
Tr
ut
hf
u
l E
x
pe
nd
itu
re
% of emissions in coalition
1%ν =
7%ν =
20%ν =
0.12
0.10
$30
$24
$10
d
p
p
p
ε
ε
= −
= −
=
=
=
(  )θ
 
 
Note: Profit is the lower bound on theoretical profit. 
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Figure 6. Minimum coalition size necessary to earn a 3 percent reduction from truthful 
expenditure for varying deviation sizes 
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Note: Profit is the lower bound on theoretical profit. 
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Table 1. Allowances issued under various planning horizons and reserve size necessary to support a 
3 percent deviation 
Planning 
Horizon 
(PH) (yrs 
from 1st yr)
No. Allowances 
Issued Over PH 
(million)
# Allowances 
Required for 3% 
Deviation Over PH 
(millions)
Reserve Necessary 
to Support 
Deviation (as % of 
Year 1 Allowances)
3 15,000 450 9%
5 25,000 750 15%
10 50,000 1,500 30%
 
Note: assumes five billion allowances are issued in the first year. 
 
Table 2. Upper and lower bounds on theoretical profit for various planning horizons and deviation 
and coalition size settings 
Planning 
Horizon 
(PH) (yrs 
from 1st 
yr)
No. 
Allowances 
Issued Over 
PH (millions)
Coalition 
(%)
Deviation (as 
% of 
Coalition 
Demand 
over PH)
Deviation 
(as % of 
Coalition 
Demand in 
1st Yr)
New Supply
(as % of total 
1st Yr 
Allowances)
Cost With 
No 
Deviation 
($ million)
Cost of 
Deviation 
Investment
($ million)
Cost Under 
Deviation 
(excl. dev. 
allowances)
($ million)
Minimum 
Profit (eq. 10)
($ million)
Annualized 
Effective Real 
Return on 
Deviation 
Investment 
from Min 
Profit
Maximum 
Profit 
(Result 1)
($ million)
Annualized 
Effective Real 
Return on 
Deviation 
Investment from 
Max Profit
5 10 30 1.5 $18,000 $450 $17,397 $153 11% $227 16%
10 10 30 3 $36,000 $900 $33,575 $1,525 41% $1,813 46%
5 10 50 2.5 $30,000 $750 $28,995 $255 7% $378 10%
10 10 50 5 $60,000 $1,500 $55,958 $2,542 23% $3,021 26%
5 10 100 5 $60,000 $1,500 $57,990 $510 4% $755 6%
10 10 100 10 $120,000 $3,000 $111,917 $5,083 12% $6,042 13%
15,000
25,000
50,000
3
5
10
 
Note: assumes $24 predeviation equilibrium price; economy-wide elasticity= -0.12 for all planning horizons; 
coalition sector-wide elasticity = -0.10 for all planning horizons; Annualized effective real return assumes deviation 
investment made at the beginning of the first year with profits earned each year over the duration of the planning 
horizon and reinvested with a 3 percent real risk free discount rate. Investing profits in a higher returning investment 
vehicle would increase the effective real return earned from the deviation. 
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